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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past few years, legal scholars and political scientists have written dozens of 
articles lamenting and applauding the increase in the privatization of governmental functions.2  
But within that body of work, little attention has been paid to the privatization of one 
particularly important governmental function – the policing of city streets and sidewalks.  
Before attempting to remedy this dearth of scholarship, this Paper provides three hypothetical 
scenarios to illustrate the issues involved. 
At the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota, private security guards patrol the 
mall to maintain order and deter shoplifters.  These security officers can deny entry to 
prospective patrons, eject patrons, and even conduct searches of patrons’ bags.  They answer 
only to the owners and operators of the Mall of America, a privately-held corporation listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange.3
In Raleigh, North Carolina, private security guards employed by Central Parking Inc., 
and operating under the local name “Park Raleigh,” patrol city owned parking lots and public 
streets lined with metered parking.  These guards can ticket vehicles that are illegally parked 
or whose drivers have failed to pay the meter.  They can ask drivers to leave a space if they 
are standing or loitering.  These officers answer only to the Central Parking corporation who 
is in turn bound by the terms of the contract it signed with the city of Raleigh. 
In Manhattan’s Financial District, an eight square block area around the New York 
Stock Exchange has been closed to traffic for five years.  Sand-laden pick-up trucks block the 
                                                 
2  See generally, Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. 
REV. 397 (2006); Mark H. Moore, Introduction to Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 
HARV. L. Rev. 1212 (2003) (discussing the privatization debate through the lens of politics); Paul R. Verkuil, 
Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 669 (2005); Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1285 (2003); Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49 (2004). 
3  Triple Five Group Website, at http://www.triplefive.com.   
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streets at the outlying intersections of this secure zone.  Drivers of vehicles wishing to enter 
these otherwise public streets must stop at checkpoints, be subjected to a search, and be 
granted permission to enter the secure zone.  This secure zone is controlled, not by the New 
York Police Department (“NYPD”) but by employees of the New York Stock Exchange 
(“NYSE”).  The checkpoints are operated and the searches conducted by the stock exchange 
security guards.  These security guards answer only to the management of the New York 
Stock Exchange, a publicly-held corporation listed on, well, the New York Stock Exchange. 
The single most important distinction between these three scenarios is the degree of 
legality of the measures taken by the private security officials.  In the first scenario, the one 
dealing with mall security guards, courts have routinely found that ejection and searches are 
permissible and are not subject to Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment restrictions.4  In such 
situations, courts consistently note the fact that malls are private property and thus the mall’s 
security guards are not like city police.5  In the second scenario, there is less certainty 
regarding the legality of the action, but most courts have upheld private policing of public 
                                                 
4  See U.S. v. Shahid, 117 F.3d 322, 326 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that mall security guards are not state actors); 
Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 906 (7th Cir.1996) (same), certiorari denied, 519 U.S. 935, 117 S.Ct. 311, 136 
L.Ed.2d 227; United States v. Garlock, 19 F.3d 441, 443 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that private parties are not 
subject to the Fourth Amendment "simply because they were engaged in the public function of law 
enforcement”), vacated on other grounds, 517 U.S. 1231, 116 S.Ct. 1872, 135 L.Ed.2d 169; Gallagher v. "Neil 
Young Freedom Concert," 49 F.3d 1442, 1457 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); White v. Scrivner Corp., 594 F.2d 140, 
142-43 (5th Cir. 1979) (same).   See also Josh Mulligan, Finding A Forum In the Simulated City: Mega Malls, 
Gated Towns, and the Promise of Pruneyard, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 533 (2004);  Jennifer Niles Coffin, 
Note, The United Mall of America: Free Speech, State Constitutions, and the Growing Fortress of Private 
Property, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 615 (2000); Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Private Property, Public Property: 
Shopping Centers and Expressive Freedom in the States, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1229 (1999); Susan Francis Gray & 
Kevin Gray, Civil Rights, Civil Wrongs and Quasi-Public Space, 1 E.H.R.L.R. 46 (1999).  
5  See David Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1165, 11184 n.84 (detailing the various state 
statutes that grant private security guards the power to conduct brief investigatory detentions).  See also Hudgens 
v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (holding that malls the first amendment did not protect expressive rights in 
shopping centers).  But note that states can require a greater degree of tolerance of speech by mall owners.  See 
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that state constitutional rules allowing 
individuals to enter a shopping mall and gather petitions did not violate the property owners' First and Fifth 
Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution). 
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parking.6  Despite their discomfort with private security guards policing public property, 
courts allow it because the security guards only monitor the area and have no power to detain 
or search citizens from this public property (at least no more so than an ordinary citizen 
could).  Furthermore, these private security firms are paid by the city and must adhere to their 
contractual obligations, thereby ensuring some degree of accountability. 
It is the third scenario which is of the most dubious legality and is the focus of this 
Paper.  Here you have private security personnel patrolling and cordoning off public streets, 
conducting searches on public land, and potentially denying entry to the secure zone.  They 
have not been given an express delegation of authority by the NYPD.  Nor are they being paid 
by the city.  They are paid by the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), and, presumably, 
accountable to the NYSE alone. 
By now, it should have occurred to the reader that each of these hypotheticals is based 
on an actual scenario.  The Mall of America does maintain an extensive security force,7 the 
City of Raleigh has contracted with a company named Central Parking, Inc. to regulate public 
parking in the city,8  and the NYSE did control the streets around Wall Street for several years 
after September 11, 2001.  The issues raised in the first two scenarios are expertly addressed 
by several authors,9 but the third scenario, the control of publicly owned space by private 
security, is a topic that has not been adequately addressed at all.  This became clear when the 
actual case came before the New York State Supreme Court in 2004 in Wall Street Parking 
                                                 
6  See City of Philadelphia v. Rendell, 888 A.2d 922, 931 n.23 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005); Mason v. City of Welch, 375 
S.E.2d 572, 573 n.3 (W.Va. 1988). 
7  See Mall of America website, http://www.mallofamerica.com/about_moa_security.aspx (last visited April 10, 
2006). 
8  See Park Raleigh website, at www.parkraleigh.com (last accessed April 10, 2006);  See also Josh Shaffer, 
Ticket Writers Rile Drivers, THE NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh), Mar. 19, 2006, A1.  
9  See Joh, supra note 2, at 50-59; Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1250. 
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Garage Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.10 and both plaintiff and defendant struggled 
to cite any significant legal authority on the issue.  Today, it is very doubtful whether private 
security personnel controlling access to, conducting searches on, or ejecting individuals from 
public streets and land is lawful.  Most courts have not had the opportunity to address the 
issue, and the few courts that have had occasion to address the issue have almost uniformly 
agreed that such private control is illegal.11  This legal uncertainty my prove equally if not 
more risky than definitive illegality.12   
Regardless of its legality, however, such private policing of public space occurs.  It 
occurs because private control of public property offers significant benefits to both private 
land owners and the public at large.  Since the attacks on the World Trade Center in 
September 2001, concerns about security in America’s cities have increased significantly.  
Attempts to address these concerns have stretched police resources thin and exposed the limits 
of what federal and state officials can do to protect the public. Often when public resources 
are inadequate to protect the public, private entities have stepped in, often at a lower cost to 
the public and with better results.13  Private entities may have a greater incentive to provide 
for protection of their own employees, visitors, and facilities, and may be better suited to 
provide for that protection, having a superior knowledge of those employees, visitors, and 
facilities than do public police.   For these reasons, and dozens more, private control over 
public spaces may be necessary and even desirable.  A solution is needed to enable cities to 
obtain real security in the best and most efficient way possible within the confines of the law.  
                                                 
10  3 Misc.3d 1014, 779 N.Y.S.2d 745 (2004).  
11  See infra Part IV.A. 
12  Not knowing whether one’s own action is legal leaves the actor constantly wondering or worrying about the 
potential for trouble, whereas knowing for sure that a particular course of action is illegal at least allows the actor 
to either avoid that course of action in the first place and rest easy or to continue that course and structure his or 
her behavior to prepare for potential punishment or successfully avoid that punishment.   
13  See Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1180 (noting the expense of public police patrols).  
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Therefore, if cities wish to secure the benefits of private security and private maintenance, 
they must either lobby for new statutory laws or find favorable common law to achieve this 
goal. 
The Paper begins, in Part I, with a more detailed discussion of the events leading up to 
Wall Street Parking Garage Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,14 events that provide an 
excellent basis for understanding the larger issues discussed later in this Paper.  Part II 
consists of a discussion of the economic, social, and political benefits that result from private 
entities exercising control over public spaces for the purpose of ensuring security.15  Part III 
acknowledges several criticisms and disadvantages of private control of publicly owned space, 
though ultimately, the Paper finds the benefits significantly more compelling.  Part IV 
examines the legal constraints on such private action and concludes that non-delegated control 
is illegal under existing law while expressly delegated control probably is legal.  Part IV also 
includes a discussion of the effect of such delegation on constitutional criminal procedure 
rights.  Part V proposes as a solution new legislation that will enable private actors to exercise 
control over public streets, plazas, sidewalks, and other publicly-owned urban spaces and 
achieve the economic, political, and social benefits that such private security promises.  The 
Paper ultimately proposes the creation of city ordinances that will allow private entities to 
                                                 
14  3 Misc.3d 1014, 779 N.Y.S.2d 745 (2004). 
15  To avoid confusion, it is important to note a preliminary distinction:  the difference between privately-owned 
public space and privately-controlled publicly-owned space.  The best example of privately-owned public space 
is the shopping mall.  Shopping malls, both the land and the structures, are generally owned by corporations or 
partnerships of investors.  While they are open to the public, and often patrolled by police, the  owners, be they 
corporations or individuals, have the right to deny any individual access to the property, to eject any individual, 
and to maintain some order.  See cases cited supra note 4.   
     While there is no single, definitive example of private control over public spaces, three pieces of real estate 
that have recently garnered a significant amount of media attention and serve as excellent [case studies] for the 
purposes of this Paper are detailed in the paragraphs that follow.  This Paper uses public property and publicly-
owned property interchangeably.  Privately-owned public property is referred to as quasi-public property. 
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PART I:  WALL STREET PARKING GARAGE CORP. V. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. 
 
As noted above, the NYSE secure zone scenario is based on an actual dispute.  Shortly 
after the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, federal officials 
and state and municipal police departments around the nation began worrying about and 
planning for the possibility of additional terrorist attacks on other potential targets.16  These 
targets consisted of landmarks and national treasures like the Statue of Liberty, the Lincoln 
Memorial, and the Empire State Building, key components of the nation’s transportation 
infrastructure like bridges and tunnels, and facilities housing the nation’s financial resources 
like the New York Stock Exchange, the Federal Reserve, and the major private banks.17  The 
New York Stock Exchange, so close to the initial target that was the World Trade Center, was 
of particular concern.18  The layout of downtown Manhattan, with its narrow streets and 
narrow sidewalks bringing building facades and vehicular traffic into close proximity, made 
the Exchange, in the eyes of the police, a very vulnerable target.19  Ignoring for the time being 
any threats to the Exchange that might come from the air, as did the previous threats, city 
officials immediately began planning to buffer the facility from possible truck bombs by 
closing the streets immediately surrounding the Exchange.  The NYPD closed the 
intersections of Wall Street and Broadway, Nassau Street and Pine Street, Wall Street and 
                                                 
16  Randal C. Archibold, A Day of Terror: Security; Fear's Ripple: Closing Down, Tightening Up, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, A17. 
17  Id.; Park Service Plans Cameras at Monuments, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 23, 2002, 8. 
18  Guarding the Big Board, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 12, 2001, C1; Robert D. McFadden & Richard W. 
Stevenson, Threats and Responses: Security Measures; New York, New Jersey and Nation's Capital Step Up 
Guard at Financial Centers, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 2, 2004, A11. 
19  Guarding the Big Board, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 12, 2001, C1. 
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William Street, William Street and Exchange Place, Broad Street and Beaver Street, Beaver 
Street and New Street, and Broadway and Exchange Place.20  This created a secure zone 
around the NYSE.21  The NYPD initially blocked these intersections with jersey barriers, 
protective concrete barriers used as road dividers and as a means of preventing access to 
prohibited areas,22 which were later replaced by weighted pickup trucks and cement planters 
designed “to deter improvised vehicle bomb attacks in New York City's financial center.”23  If 
you could keep trucks away from the New York Stock Exchange, the thinking went, you 
could prevent at least, large scale attacks from the ground.  After some time, the NYPD 
physically transferred operation of the secure zone checkpoints to the NYSE.24  But this 
transfer of operation was not official.  The NYPD simply left and the NYSE security team 
replaced them at the checkpoints.  No formal paper authorization occurred.25  
But while the police were busy preparing for attacks by terrorists on major landmarks, 
they were not prepared for a legal challenge in the courts by Joseph Vassallo, a local 
businessman.  Vassallo was the owner and operator of the Wall Street Parking Garage located 
                                                 
20  Wall Street Parking Garage Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 3 Misc.3d 1014, 1017, 779 N.Y.S.2d 
745, 748 (2004).  
21  Id. 
22  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000).  The name “jersey barrier” derives 
from the fact that these concrete dividers were originally developed to divide multiple lanes on highways in the 
State of New Jersey.   The barriers prevented vehicles from crossing over the median into oncoming lanes of 
traffic.  See U.S. Dep’t of Transportation Federal Highway Administration website, at 
http://www.tfhrc.gov/pubrds/marapr00/concrete.htm (last visited April 10, 2006). 
23  Wall Street Parking Garage, 3 Misc.3d at 1017, 779 N.Y.S.2d at 748. 
24  Id. at 1022, 779 N.Y.S.2d at 752 (“At some point thereafter, and it is unclear as to when this happened, the 
control of the security posts at each of the blocked intersections were transferred to NYSE security.”).   
25  Id. (“The NYSE has yet to provide this court with any evidence of an agreement giving them the authority to 
maintain the security perimeter and/or conduct the searches that their private security force conducts daily.”).  
The transcript from the hearing for a preliminary injunction demonstrates just how dubious this transfer was.  
Counsel for the NYSE, Douglas W. Henkin, attempted to explain the situation to Judge Tolub: "What has 
happened is not that the N.Y.S.E. has closed off those streets…but the N.Y.S.E. has manned those closures at the 
behest of the N.Y.P.D., following their initial closures by the N.Y.P.D."  Judge Tolub asked, "So, you have an 
official request from the N.Y.P.D. asking you to man those posts?"  To which Mr. Henkin replied, "You mean in 
writing? No."  Id. 
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on Exchange Place, between William and Broad Streets,26 right in the middle of the secure 
zone.  All of Vassallo’s patrons, the hundreds of Wall Street investment bankers, analysts, 
secretaries, and other professionals who parked in his garage, were suddenly forced to stop at 
NYSE security checkpoints, consent to searches, and then proceed to the garage.  Whether it 
was their objection to the searches themselves or their impatience with waiting in traffic lines 
to undergo the searches and risk being late for work, many of Vassallo’s patrons stopped 
parking in his garage after the barricades went up.  Prior to September 11, 2001, an average of 
150 to 160 cars parked in Vassallo’s garage per day.27  After September 11th and the erection 
of the barricades, the garage’s business dropped off significantly.  In 2003 an average of 68 
cars parked in the garage per day.28  And the numbers continued to drop.  Though based only 
on estimates by Vassallo, between February 1 and February 20, 2004, an average of 65 
patrons parked in the garage per day.29  From February 21 to March 2, 2004, an average of 38 
patrons parked in the garage per day.30  And on March 3, 2004, only 25 vehicles parked in the 
Wall Street Parking Garage.31  After voicing his complaints, Vassallo did what most would 
do:  he sued.  And he won.  Judge Tolub of the New York State Supreme Court held that 
NYSE’s operation of security checkpoints on the public streets surrounding the Exchange was 
unauthorized and therefore illegal.32  Accordingly, he found the continued operation of such 
checkpoints to constitute a public nuisance, and ordered the NYSE to abandon its 
barricades.33  Though Vassallo’s victory was short lived—the Appellate Courts would 
                                                 
26  The address for the garage is 45 Wall Street, but the garage occupies the rear of that building, fronting only 
Exchange Place. 
27  Wall Street Parking Garage, 3 Misc.3d at 1017, 779 N.Y.S.2d at 749. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. at 1022, 779 N.Y.S.2d at 752. 
33  Id. at 1023, 779 N.Y.S.2d at 753. 
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eventually reverse Tolub’s ruling on other grounds—the suit between Vassallo and the New 
York Stock Exchange exposed an issue the law has yet to address adequately: the private 
control of publicly-owned spaces. 
Nor are the issues raised by the NYSE case unique to the Wall Street setting.  The 
installation of bollards34 and cement planters at the edge of sidewalks by commercial property 
owners and managers has increased significantly over the last ten years35 and serves as 
another prevalent example of private actors exercising control over public spaces to ensure the 
security of their employees, visitors, and facilities.     
In August 2004, the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice issued a security 
crackdown after receiving information that several high profile financial buildings might be at 
risk of a terrorist attack.  Almost a year later, the Department of Justice announced that it had 
arrested several men and changed them with conspiracy to use unconventional weapons in the 
United States and with providing material support to terrorists.36  When these men were 
arrested, they possessed a video camera containing footage of several high profile properties 
such as the Citicorp Center in New York, the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank in Washington, D.C., and the Prudential Financial Center in Newark, New Jersey.37   
                                                 
34  A bollard is a wood or metal post or pole set in the ground at set intervals to close a road or path to vehicles of 
a certain width.  Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary at 129 (10th ed. 1999).  In cities, bollards are installed 
at the outer perimeter of sidewalks to prevent bomb-laden vans, for instance, from either piercing the façade of 
the building or getting close enough to cause significant damage.  Architecture of Security, NPR, at 
http://www.npr.org/programs/watc/features/2002/jan/security/020126.security.html.  Generally, for a truck bomb 
to cause enough damage to the infrastructure of the building to make it collapse, the truck must either be inside 
the building or close to it.  The bollards keep the truck far enough away to prevent total collapse, even if the 
resulting explosion causes damage to the façade and immediate interior. 
35  See Patricia Leigh Brown, Ideas & Trends; Designs for a Land of Bombs and Guns, THE NEW YORK TIMES, 
May 28, 1995, D5 (“Barricades and bollards have become the newest accessory on this country's psychic 
frontier. But to many architects and designers who specialize in security planning, their presence merely 
confirms an evolving design esthetic that has changed everything from courthouses to parking garages.”); Louis 
Uchitelle and John Markoff, Terrorbusters Inc., THE NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 17, 2004, C1.
36  Tony Pugh, Terror Warning Names U.S. Financial Centers Alert Raised at `Iconic' Buildings, THE 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Knight Ridder), Aug. 2, 2004, 1A. 
37  Id. 
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Around the same time, a 35-year-old Pakistani man named Kamran Shaikh was 
apprehended by federal authorities while videotaping a North Carolina skyline.38  Though 
then-Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge eventually said that there was nothing to tie 
Shaikh to terrorist organizations, his arrest quickly garnered the attention of elected officials 
and property owners in the cities and buildings Shaikh videotaped.  When he was arrested, 
Shaikh was taking pictures of the 60-story Bank of America headquarters in downtown 
Charlotte.  Authorities also noted that videotapes in Shaikh’s possession showed buildings 
and transit systems in a number of southern cities, including Austin, Houston, Dallas, New 
Orleans, and Atlanta.39 
Within months, bollards were installed (or planned) at each of these above sites to 
keep explosive-laden trucks a safe distance away from the buildings.40  Though bollards 
would have been powerless to prevent the attacks of September 11th, recent surveillance by 
alleged terrorist operatives like the men discussed above indicates that terrorists might plan to 
use truck bombs to destroy future target buildings, a threat that bollards might mitigate.41
As these examples demonstrate, private control of public spaces is often necessary to 
ensure security.  But it may also be desirable.  The following section discusses in further 
detail the political, social, and economic benefits that emerge from private control of publicly-
owned space.         
                                                 
38  Miles O'Brien, Fredricka Whitfield, Sean Callebs, Jeffrey Toobin, Transcript, Terror Suspect Held for 
Possibly Casing Southern U.S. Targets; Al-Sadr Vows to Fight to Death in Najaf, CNN News, August 11, 2005, 
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0408/11/lol.04.html. 
39  Id. 
40  Natalie Keith, The Reality of Risk: Design and Construction Industries Creating New Standards for Building 
Security, NEW YORK CONSTRUCTION, Sept. 2004, at 
http://newyork.construction.com/features/archive/2004/0409_cover4.asp; David Rennie, I Don’t Understand 
Why World Bank is a Target?, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK), Mar. 8, 2004, at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/08/03/wterr203.xml.   
41  See Witold Rybczynski, The Fear Factor: The Fallacies of Making Ground Zero More Secure, SLATE, June 
1, 2005, at http://www.slate.com/id/2119857.  
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PART II:  POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, & SOCIAL BENEFITS OF PRIVATE CONTROLLED OF PUBLICLY- 
OWNED SPACES 
   
A significant number of benefits result when private entities exercise control over 
public spaces.  These benefits can be divided into three categories:  political benefits, 
economic benefits, and social benefits. 
 
A. Political Benefits 
 
There are several political benefits that result from private control of public space.  
First, security, today, is a political necessity.  Americans do not want to live in fear, and after 
9/11, that is precisely what began to happen.  Americans fear that their cities will begin to 
resemble their Israeli counterparts; they fear having to wonder, every time they enter a 
Starbucks or a Ben & Jerry’s, whether a fellow patron’s overcoat might conceal a bomb.  It is 
simply good politics to protect the public or, at least, give the perception of protecting the 
public.  The more people providing security, the safer Americans will feel and the happier 
they will be.  If private security or a mix of private and public security better protects people, 
elected officials are likely to let private security do its job.  After all, it is these same public 
elected officials who are likely to receive and take most of the credit for this elevated level of 
security.  And let us not forget that if private actors are willing to provide security in addition 
to that provided by the city, state, and federal governments, the level of actual, not just 
perceived, security will increase.  This is perhaps the most important factor to consider.   
Second, private control over public spaces spreads the responsibility for the protection 
of and care for these spaces.  When security failures occur, they too can be spread over public 
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elected officials and the private sector, thus buffering elected officials from the full brunt of 
the public’s ire. 
Allowing private organizations to provide for their own security might also be a way 
for elected officials to help these organizations reduce their liability.   The potential liability 
of employers for failing to provide a safe and secure environment leads private actors to seek 
a greater role in providing that security outside their borders.  There have been several recent 
cases in which employers were held liable for injuries sustained by their employees in the 
office or outside the office on the company’s property.42  Cases such as these, where the 
foreseeability of the battery or murder of an employee is questionable, have been criticized by 
several legal scholars,43 but it takes no stretch of the imagination to envision courts holding 
employers liable for injuries to their employees incurred during a terrorist attack.  Imagine for 
a second a truck, filled with explosives, driving into the lobby of a commercial office building 
in downtown Chicago.  Two-hundred and ninety people are killed when the bomb explodes.  
The families of the victims sue the owners and managers of the building for wrongful death 
and negligence.  At the civil trial, the plaintiffs put on evidence that the owners and managers 
of the building could have installed bollards or jersey barriers at the edge of the sidewalks or 
petitioned the city to close the surrounding streets to vehicular traffic, as the New York Stock 
Exchange did after September 11th.  The jury, finding that these remedies to be readily 
available and that the choice not to pursue these reasonable security measures rose to the level 
                                                 
42  Vaughn v. Granite City Steel, 217 Ill. App.3d 47; 576 N.E.2d 774 (5th Dist. 1991) (affirming a jury’s finding 
that employer was negligent when an employee was murdered in the employer’s parking lot);  Martin v. 
McDonald's Corp., 213 Ill. App.3d 487; 572 N.E.2d 1073 (1st Dist. 1991) (affirming a jury’s finding that 
employer McDonald’s was liable for wrongful death and negligence where employees were killed in a robbery 
in a McDonald’s restaurant);  Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 125 Ill.2d 203; 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988) (Where 
several employees were attack and killed, the court held that a landowner assumes a duty to protect its 
employees and patrons when it voluntarily undertakes to provide security measures and can then be found liable 
for negligently if it inadequately protects those employees and patrons.). 
43  See, e.g., Kyle Riley, Employer TROs Are All the Rage: A New Approach to Workplace Violence, 4 NEV. L.J. 
1, 7 (noting the difficulty employers have preventing some types of crimes against their employees and patrons).  
 - 14 -
of negligence, finds the property owners liable for the deaths, lost income, and emotion 
distress resulting from the attack.  Private property owners must make every reasonable effort 
to secure their property in order to avoid liability.  And because it is often necessary to secure 
the surrounding public space such as streets and sidewalks in order to effectively secure the 
interior of private office buildings,44 only by allowing securing that surrounding public space 
can the corporation avoid liability.  If corporations can be held liable for injuries and deaths 
resulting from such attacks, they will want to be able to help secure their space and may lobby 
for it if it is not forthcoming.          
Fourth, as odd as it sounds, private police may prove more accountable to the users of 
their space than the public police.45  One author summarizes this argument best:  
Unlike public police forces, private guard companies have to answer to the discipline 
of the market.  [A] privately employed police officer inevitably “recognizes the 
importance of establishing positive relationships with the consumers of the service and 
develops innovative approaches to community problems,” whereas “the public police 
are paid through the compilation of public taxes and are, therefore, answerable to 
every business and citizen in the city but are not accountable to them.”46
   
Thus, private policing of public spaces can be viewed as a reaction to the “excessive 
independence and insularity” of modern city police forces—“an answer to the common 
complaint ‘that a police force should be responsive to those policed, while autonomous 
professionals . . . have a notorious tendency to believe that they know what is 'really' best for 
the clients, and therefore what the client 'ought' to want.’”47  We do not argue that private 
police are more politically accountable to the city as a whole, but to the residents, retailers, 
corporate residents, and visitors of the neighborhood or district in which they operate.  
                                                 
44  The most effective way to prevent a bomb-laden truck from bringing down a 60-story office building is to 
extend the perimeter outward.  The truck bomb can cause significant structural damage even if it never enters the 
lobby of that building.  See NYPD report on the proposed structural changes to the Freedom Tower.  
45  See Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1189-90. 
46  Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1189-90 (citing James J. Vardalis, Privatization of Public Police: Houston, Texas, 
3 SECURITY J. 210, 211 (1992)). 
47  Id. 
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Whereas the public police answer to many masters, some with conflicting messages, private 
police prove more accountable to the practical needs of their constituency.    
Finally, there may be some political benefit for providing the public with more public 
arcades and plazas.  Though closed streets may draw the driving public’s ire, in some areas 
where traffic is already minimal, such as downtown and midtown Manhattan, Quincy Market 
in Boston, or around the White House in Washington, the closure of streets might lead to the 
proliferation of outdoor cafes and increase the livability of an area of the city.  Elected 
officials will be credited for these additions, even if surrounding property owners are the ones 
facilitating the change.  But these businesses may only support these closures if they are sure 
that these public spaces will be secure.  And if they city cannot fund the security, the private 
sector might. 
 
B. Economic Benefits 
 
The economic benefits of allowing private actors to control public space are 
significant.  First, private control over public spaces spreads the costs of protection and care 
for these spaces.  Allowing private actors to control plazas, squares, streets, sidewalks, and 
other similar spaces enables more of it.  When city coffers are stretched thin, the number of 
parks, plazas, and pedestrian-only streets the city can fund is limited.  Allowing private 
entities to operate and maintain these spaces ensures more of them.  Even where city funds are 
available, allowing private land owners to provide security allows the city to employ the 
resources that would have been expended on policing elsewhere.    
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Second, as with privatization of any governmental agency or function, private policing 
of publicly-owned space offers a greater degree of efficiency and flexibility48  Private police 
forces are “free from civil service rules, reporting requirements, and other rules imposed on 
government agencies.”49  They are free from unions and from “bureaucratic traditions.”50
Sometimes private land owners are better able to create effective security or effective 
aesthetics.  For instance, private land owners know the area better, its uses, and its layout.  
Their architects, engineers, and security personnel work in the area far more than their public 
counterparts.  They know how many people are there at what times of day.  As Jane Jacobs 
writes in The Death and Life of Great American Cities, the safest streets are those with a 
network of neighbors not excellent policing.51  This is true of streets in commercial areas as 
well.  A network of business owners has as much incentive as a network of homeowners to 
ensure the security in and around their property and businesses.  As a result, private 
landowners will pay what is necessary, but only what is necessary, to protect the value of land 
and life.  Thus there is less waste in private policing.  A private corporation may pay its 
security guards more than a typical police officer if that makes a difference in the quality of 
the service, if it makes their buildings safer.  Or that corporation may pay for a larger number 
of security guards.  But it will not pay both higher salaries and employ more guards than 
necessary because the counterbalance to security interests is cost.  The public sector often 
does not work as efficiently.  Graft, corruption, and lobbying by local police unions, may 
result in a greater number of police in a given area than is necessary.52  As David Sklansky 
                                                 
48  Shirley Kressell, Privatizing the Public Realm, New Democracy World, at 
http://newdemocracyworld.org/space.htm. 
49  Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1189. 
50  Id. 
51  JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 31-32 (Vintage Books 1961). 
52  ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER 730-__ (1974) (discussing the history of inefficient allocation of city 
resources). 
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notes, “Private companies are thought more accountable than government because they 
answer to their particular customers instead of to the general public.”53  With public policing, 
the security service is often not tailored to the neighborhood or businesses being protected and 
money is wasted.54
Finally, the privatization of public space may be highly profitable to real estate 
developers and retail business.55  Private developers and businesses are free to decorate and 
configure these spaces in the most appealing way possible.  If a restaurant controls a portion 
of a public plaza, it can set up café tables to lure patrons.  It takes no market study to show 
that there is a demand for outdoor dining in warm weather.  In its report on public squares, the 
Project for Public Spaces notes that, based on what the communities they work with tell them, 
“people today are crying out for these kinds of lively gathering places.  Everyday citizens 
recognize the value of places where civic life flourishes and where different cultures can mix, 
places that heal social isolation--even if most public leaders are slow to understand.”56  But it 
is likely that these private interests will only use the space if it is secure, and if need be, they 
may be more than willing to secure it themselves.   
 
C. Social Benefits 
 
There are significant social benefits afforded by the private control over public space.  
First, consider the psychological importance of security.  In his now-famous article, A Theory 
of Human Motivation, Abraham Maslow described a pyramid of needs. 57  What has come to 
                                                 
53  Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1191. 
54  Id. at 1180-81. 
55  Kressel, supra note 48. 
56  Fred Kent, Kathy Madden, & Phil Myrick, Launching a New Tradition of Great Public Squares, in Making 
Places, Dec. 2005, available at 
http://www.pps.org/info/newsletter/december2005/squares_intro?referrer=newsletter_contents. 
57  See Abraham H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW 50, 370-396 (1943) 
(discussing his pyramid of needs).   
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be one of the most accepted theories of psychology, Maslow’s pyramid has five levels of 
needs: physiological, safety, love/belonging, esteem, actualization.58  Each subsequent level 
cannot be obtained until the lower levels are achieved; the higher levels must rest on strong 
foundations.  According to Maslow, security, feeling safe, is one of the most basic needs of 
human beings.59  Safety and security rank above all other desires, and physical safety above 
most other forms of safety.  If residents and employees do not feel safe living and working in 
cities, they will not function correctly.  Or they will leave.  Knowing that private entities are 
also taking an active part in their security, seeing the physical manifestations of this security, 
may make for happier, more productive individuals.     
Second, allowing private land owners to control the surrounding public space 
reaffirms the values associated with individual land ownership.  “Private policing,” David 
Sklansky writes, “can easily be understood as the natural product of three paradigmatically 
private functions.  The first is self-defense, widely viewed as an inherent right, particularly in 
America….  The second is economic exchange, the ‘free market’….  The third is the use and 
enjoyment of property generally thought to include the right of owners to place conditions on 
those invited onto their property.”60  One could argue, then, allowing major land owners in 
dense urban centers to take an active role in their own security is necessary for them to fully 
enjoy the rights of ownership of that land.   
Third, private policing empowers those it protects.  Sklansky argues that this 
empowerment has two separate effects on the land owners.  First, it reaffirms the notion that 
“every citizen should take responsibility for his or her own protection” and that depending on 
                                                 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1188-89. 
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the government for complete protection is “enfeebling.”61  The second is that “arranging for 
private policing generally entails a more or less voluntary association of residents or business 
owners that, in the process of providing joint security, also builds social capital.”62  While this 
second effect may be logically applied to the social capital built in forming and operating 
neighborhood watch groups, it is also easily applied to the social capital build as employer 
and employees work to ensure security in and around the building, or the social capital 
created as businesses work together to ensure a safe zone around their properties.  Consider 
the social benefits that might have resulted had the NYSE and the Wall Street Parking Garage 
and all the other businesses within the secure zone met and discussed the best means of 
ensuring that the streets within were safe from dangerous individuals and vehicles.  While this 
social capital was never realized because of the unilateral path chosen by NYSE, it certainly 
would not have resulted if the NYPD had continued to operate the cordons.  Private control of 
public places offers, though does not ensure, the private land owners abutting the property a 
chance to empower themselves and build lasting social capital.    
Finally, consider the aesthetic benefits that private control over public space allows.  
Open spaces such as public plazas and closed streets are inviting to people; in a nation 
increasingly cut off from human interaction by the automobile and technology, newly 
designed public spaces provide a much-needed opportunity for people to mix.  More public 
gathering spaces are better.63   
                                                 
61  Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1190. 
62  Id. 
63  This Paper recognizes, however, that pedestrian plazas and arcades are best suited to dense, mass transit-
oriented cities like New York, Chicago, Boston, and San Francisco (or to college towns where most of the 
residents do not have cars).  The pedestrianization of downtown streets in cities still enamored with the 
automobile, like Raleigh, North Carolina, has proven difficult.  This Paper posits, however, that our nation’s 
densest cities are its most important ones.  As such, they are also the more likely targets of terrorist and the most 
in need of innovative solutions to security problems liked increased pedestrian arcades and plazas.      
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The United States suffers from a severe lack of public plazas, a notable deficit for 
nation that has, for good or for ill, earned the label of empire.  One of the defining 
characteristics of all the great empires that came before the U.S. was a commitment to and a 
successful implementation of public plazas and squares, great areas that allowed the masses to 
be inspired and to mix.  From the German Platz to the Roman Piazza, from the French Place 
to the British Square, every major civilization or nation that developed great urban centers had 
a significant number of plazas for the enjoyment of urban dwellers.  It can be argued that the 
creation of thriving public squares was a prerequisite for being considered a great nation or 
civilization.  And these spaces were for more than mere enjoyment.  They helped businesses 
to thrive; outdoor cafes and shops would attract more patrons if they were located in a plaza 
where they might not only draw in longtime patrons but the occasional stroller or those 
visiting adjacent cafes and shops.64    
Because most U.S. cities experienced their greatest periods of development after the 
invention of the automobile, many of these cities, when faced with the choice of creating 
public pedestrian-focused plazas closed to automobiles or thru-streets designed to alleviate 
traffic congestion, chose the latter.  Even some cities, or sections of cities, that had matured 
before the advent of the automobile, cities that had thriving public plazas, completely changed 
the nature of these plazas by allowing roads and streets to cross the open plane of space.  
Washington Square in New York is a fine example.65  Though the city maintained almost all 
of the open space constituting the square, and the park continued to serve many of the needs 
                                                 
64  See Benjamin Fried, A New Kind of Market Economics, Project for Public Spaces, available at 
http://www.pps.org/markets/info/markets_articles/markets_economic_development (last visited April 10, 2006) 
(“Whereas a big box retail development relies on cheap prices (and low-wage labor) to draw customers, a market 
must offer a public space experience and mix of products tailored to the people it serves in order to be 
economically competitive.”). 
65  Washington Square is listed by the Project for Public Spaces as one of the top 12 public squares in the U.S. 
and Canada.  See Top 12 Public Squares in the U.S. and Canada, in Making Spaces, Dec. 2005, available at 
http://www.pps.org/info/newsletter/december2005/us_canada_squares?referrer=newsletter_contents.    
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served by the European plazas and squares, the existence of roads for motor vehicle traffic 
within the area bounded by structures changed the nature of the space in one very important 
way.  The square was now isolated from the surrounding buildings, effectively severing the 
tie between the surrounding buildings and the open space.  The cafes or restaurants housed in 
the perimeter buildings abutted streets with motor vehicles speeding by at perhaps thirty-five 
miles per hour.  The ability of patrons to walk from the fountains, lawns, and chess tables in 
the park to the stores, restaurants, and cafes was drastically reduced due to both psychological 
and physical constraints.  Even if one did not mind the de minimis inconvenience of having to 
cross a small street, the psychological barrier remained.  The park did not seem as accessible.  
The stream of cars violated the intimacy of the space and cut off the businesses from patrons.     
There is some indication that the public square is gaining newfound importance in 
American life.  As urbanist Fred Kent notes, “[T]here's new excitement about reinventing the 
square as a key asset for 21st century cities.  With historical roots in cultures all over the 
world, squares are being rediscovered as a powerful means of transforming communities.”66  
Increasing control over these public fora by the private sector, particularly in times of 
shrinking governmental budgets driven by lower taxes, may make public squares more viable 
than they have been in our nation’s immediate past.  And the more advocates for public 
gathering spaces there are, the more spaces we will have.  Support for public space from 
business and corporate America may be exactly what is needed for the square to make a 




                                                 
66  Fred Kent, Kathy Madden, & Phil Myrick, Launching a New Tradition of Great Public Squares, in Making 
Places, Dec. 2005, available at 
http://www.pps.org/info/newsletter/december2005/squares_intro?referrer=newsletter_contents.   
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PART III:  DISADVANTAGES OF PRIVATE CONTROL OVER PUBLICLY-OWNED SPACE 
 
Just as there are political, economic, and social benefits obtained from the private 
control of publicly-owned space, there are also political, economic, and social disadvantages 
as well.  
  
A. Political Disadvantages 
 
It is important to acknowledge the extensive body of literature arguing that the private 
control of public space is fundamentally undemocratic.67  Private control over public spaces 
reduces the accountability of elected officials and allows the views of the general public to be 
disregarded.  David Sklansky, for example, argues that  “[t]hose who come into contact with 
private [security] guards but do not help to pay for them may not welcome the fact that such 
guards are accountable exclusively to their customers.”68  If private guards abuse their power, 
elected officials are less likely to be blamed for the abuse or the lack of oversight that allowed 
the abuse.  And those responsible for the security need not listen to the views of the public at 
large.  This police function, traditionally within the province of the politically elected 
government, is influenced then only by the market.  Those individuals not a part of the market 
no longer have input.  Their views become irrelevant.     
 
B.  Economic Disadvantages
There are some economic concerns that arise when private entities control publicly-
owned land.  Taking on de facto security responsibilities might increase corporations or 
                                                 
67  See generally MARGARET KOHN, BRAVE NEW NEIGHBORHOODS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC SPACE 2-3 
(2004); Mike Davis, Fortress Los Angeles: The Militarization of Urban Space in VARIATIONS ON A THEME PARK: 
THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE END OF PUBLIC SPACE 155 (Michael Sorkin, ed.) (1992) (“The universal 
consequence of the crusade to secure the city is the destruction of ally truly democratic urban space.”). 
68  Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1191. 
 - 23 -
private land owners’ liability for injuries occurring on adjacent publicly-owned land.  This is 
the flip-side of the property owner liability issue discussed above.69  Once businesses begin to 
take responsibility for protecting their employees by securing adjoining public parcels, out of 
fear of being held liable for inaction, they effect a damning admission:  that such attacks are 
foreseeable and that security measures are available.  Thus, by attempting to better secure 
their premises to avoid liability, they risk greater liability if the security measures they do 
provide prove inadequate.   
With regard to the policing of adjacent public space, private organizations also risk 
criminal liability for violation of individuals’ constitutional rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242 if 
their agents improperly search, seize, detain, or compel incriminating statements. 70   
Private policing also leads to various externalities.71  First, there is a free-rider 
problem.  when the NYSE pays to maintain the secure zone, the J.P. Morgan headquarters is 
protected from terrorist attacks as well without Morgan paying a cent.  J.P. Morgan has no 
incentive to take part in funding this security and obtains a significant benefit with zero cost.  
Second, private policing effectively helps some by harming others.  As Sklansky notes, 
“policing protects some people by interfering with other people, and there is no obvious way 
to require those who are protected to pay for the burdens imposed on those they are protected 
from.”72  Thus the NYSE benefits from its searches but does not compensate those searched 
for their time and good will.  In the end, “[a]ll of these externalities can be anticipated to warp 
private expenditures for police protection away from what economists would consider socially 
                                                 
69  See notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
70  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 (2004). 
71  Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1192. 
72  Id. at 1192-1193. 
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efficient.  One might expect the private sector to overfund crime control strategies with large 
negative externalities….”73
 
C.  Social Disadvantages
 There are social disadvantages to private policing of public space.  Many urbanists 
might be alarmed at the potential for discrimination private control of public space allows.  
Private control of public space enables those in control “to exclude ‘undesirables’—the 
homeless, the downmarket, the non-shoppers—from places of investment and privilege 
intended to attract up-scale suburbanites, the urban elite, and tourists with disposable 
income.”74  While the exclusion of “non-shoppers” is of little consequence, the exclusion of 
the homeless and “the downmarket”—and the identity of those making the determination of 
who is downmarket—should be of great concern.  At worst, private policing might permit 
arbitrary discrimination.  At the lest, if this paradigm spread, it might effectively turn cities 
into theme parks for the affluent.    
 
 
PART IV:  THE LAW OF PRIVATE CONTROL OF PUBLICLY-OWNED SPACE 
 
The economic, political, and social benefits of private control of public spaces 
notwithstanding, there is considerable doubt over whether or not such private control is 
lawful.  While the power of state and federal government officials to search, seize, or restrict 
access to public property is indisputable, the power of private actors to do so is far less 
certain.  This section discusses the powers of a private actor, be it an individual or 
corporation, to exercise control over public property in both the absence of delegated 
                                                 
73  Id. at 1193. 
74  Kressel, supra note 48. 
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authority and when such control is delegated by municipal, state, or federal government.  
Legal authority and the source of that authority depend on the circumstances.  Here we seek to 
determine two separate questions:  Is the actual exercise of control over these streets 
permissible, and if so, what constitutional constraints apply? 
Over the past several decades, private policing has been on the rise.75  By private 
police, this Paper refers specifically to private security personnel, individuals who carry out 
many of the same duties as public police, such as conducting searches, detaining individuals, 
investigating crimes, and securing special boundaries, but are paid by and accountable to the 
corporations or landowners for whom the work.  Little has been written about the laws 
pertaining to private police.  As Elizabeth Joh, professor of law at the University of California 
at Davis, points out, few empirical studies of private police conduct exist, and “legal 
scholars—especially those who study the public police—have paid them hardly any 
attention.”76  More importantly, state courts and legislatures have also neglected the private 
police, developing few rules or regulations to govern private police.77  At the federal level, 
“[t]here exist hardly any…statutes directed specifically toward private police conduct,”78 and 
both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have held that federal constitutional 
restraints placed on public police do not apply to the private police.79  Thus, the Fourth 
Amendment constraints on searches and seizures and other rules of constitutional criminal 
procedure derived from the Fifth and Sixth Amendments generally do not apply.  This dearth 
of scholarship and case law provides this author with a unique opportunity to analyze the little 
                                                 
75  See Joh, supra note 2, at 50-59; Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1167.  
76  Joh, supra note 2, at 49. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
 - 26 -
law that does exist and recommend new legal rules and rationales for evaluating the private 
control of publicly-owned space. 
 
A.  Where No Express Delegation Has Been Made 
 
When neither the city nor an agency (the police department) has expressly delegated 
its police powers over a particular parcel of land to a private security force, any actions taken 
by that security force to control access to the public property or to search individuals on that 
property is illegal. 
In New York City, for example, it is illegal for private citizens to close a public street 
to either pedestrian or vehicular traffic without a permit.80  Though there was some 
uncertainty as to this position in the early days of the city’s history — in the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, “it was by no means clear whether the power to map out the rapidly 
growing city belonged to the municipal governing body, the Common Council, or to private 
landowners”81 — in 1807 the city appealed to the state to settle the issue, and the state 
appointed a commission with “the ‘exclusive power to lay out streets, roads and public 
squares,’ and to ‘shut up’ streets already built by private parties.”82  Today, the State Law of 
New York gives cities within the state the power to “lay out, establish, construct, maintain, 
operate, alter and discontinue streets.”83  Accordingly, New York City makes provision for 
such street closures in two separate sections of the city’s administrative code:  § 5-432 which 
deals with the permanent closing of public streets and § 19-107 which deals with the 
temporary closing of public streets.  Each of these provisions is discussed in greater detail in 
this section.   
                                                 
80  NYC Code § 19-107 (2005). 
81  JAMES TRAUB, THE DEVIL’S PLAYGROUND 4 (Random House 2004). 
82  Id. 
83  N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(7) (2000). 
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Section 5-432 of the New York City Code reads as follows: 
The city may authorize the closing or discontinuance of the surface, subsurface or air 
space over such streets therein, in whole or in part, upon the determination that (1) 
such closing or discontinuance will further the health, safety, pedestrian or vehicular 
circulation, housing, economic development or general welfare of the city and (2) in 
the case of a partial closing or discontinuance of the subsurface or air space over such 
streets, will not substantially interfere with pedestrian or vehicular use of such 
streets.”84   
 
Unlike § 19-107, discussed infra, § 5-432 does not allow the city to issue permits to 
private parties to close a street.  Only the city can permanently close a public street.  The city 
can close a street at the request of a public entity for the achievement of a public benefit,85 but 
the actual process for closing the street must be undertaken by the city itself.  For instance, for 
a city street to be closed, the New York City Board of Estimate must pass a resolution 
providing for the institution of proceedings for the closing or discontinuance of [a] street.86  
The city must compensate any owners of adjacent property who are affected or damaged by 
the closing and any owners of title to land that is actually a part of the street that is closed.87  
According to § 5-432, then, no private entity like the NYSE can permanently close a city 
street. 
Additionally, even if the city itself authorizes the closing of a city street, § 5-432 
requires that the city do so for a public purpose.  As §5-432 notes, a public purpose might be 
to protect the health or safety of pedestrians, to encourage economic development, or to 
further the “welfare of the city,” but closing a street to further the interests of one large and 
                                                 
84  N.Y.C. Code § 5-432 (2000). 
85  Id. 
86  § 5-433. 
87  § 5-432.  For example, it is not uncommon for private individuals to own the land on which a city street runs.  
In such instances, the city likely owns an easement on that private property for that street.  If a street on private 
land is closed, the owner of that land must also be compensated.  Often the city will attempt to buy the fee title 
for the land on which the street runs.  See § 5-433(2). 
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influential property owner does not qualify as a public purpose.88  Closing the streets around 
Wall Street in a way that disproportionately benefits one land owner, NYSE, is not a public 
necessity or sufficiently tailored to bettering the welfare or safety of the city.      
Section 19-107 of the New York City Code provides for the temporary closure of city 
streets.89  Section 19-107 [says] that a city street can only be temporarily closed by the 
Commissioner of the Department of Transportation and even then only in certain 
circumstances.90  The commissioner himself may order a street to be temporarily closed 
“when…travel therein is deemed to be dangerous to life [as a result of construction],” when 
the police, fire, or Office of Emergency Management advises that such a closure is necessary 
to protect life or safety, or for another necessary “public purpose.”91  Or the commissioner 
may issue a permit to have a street temporarily closed for these same reasons.92     
“Public purpose” under § 19-107 specifically has not yet been interpreted by the 
courts,93 but one can reasonably assume it means the same thing it means under § 5-432.  
Accordingly, the case law interpreting public purpose under § 5-432 should control. 94  
The temporary closure of streets is not without provision for maintaining 
accountability either.  When the Commissioner of Transportation does close or issue a permit 
to close a city street, if the closure will last for more than five days, he must inform the local 
community board and the city council member in whose district the street is located, provide 
                                                 
88  See, e.g., City of N.Y. v. Aviation Distributors, Inc., 84 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1948) (“land consisting of street area 
under the viaduct running around Grand Central Terminal did not cease to be a public street so as to allow City 
to grant a permit for its private use”);  Stahl Soap Corp. v. City of N.Y., 4 A.D.2d 957, 167 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1957), 
aff’d 5 N.Y.2d 200, 182 N.Y.S.2d 808, 156 N.E.2d 443 (1959) (Where a brewery company owned all the land 
on both sides of a public street for one block, city’s agreement to close the street so that the brewery might use 
the street for the parking of its vehicles was unlawful.  The closure was not intended to serve a public necessity 
or “for the preservation of the regularity and uniformity of the streets.”). 
89  N.Y.C. Code § 19-107 (2000). 
90  Id. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  See supra note 88. 
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reasons for the closure, and estimate the date that the street will reopen.95  The code allows 
for longer closures, but with greater duration comes additional requirements.  If a public street 
is fully closed for more than one hundred eighty consecutive days, the commissioner must 
issue a “community reassessment, impact, and amelioration statement (CRIA).”96  The CRIA 
must be approved by the commissioner of Transportation or the government entity requesting 
the permit and initiating the street closure.97  The CRIA statement must contain the following:   
(a) the objectives of the closure and the reasons why the continued street closure is 
necessary to attain those objectives, which in the case of a closure initiated by a local 
law enforcement agency for security reasons shall be satisfied by a statement from the 
local law enforcement agency that the street has been closed and will remain closed 
for security reasons; (b) identification of the least expensive alternative means of 
attaining those objectives and the costs of such alternatives, or a statement and 
explanation as to the unavailability of such alternatives, which in the case of a closure 
initiated by a local law enforcement agency for security reasons shall be satisfied by a 
statement from the law enforcement agency that there are no alternative means 
available; (c) how the continued street closure will impact access and traffic flow to 
and within the surrounding community, including but not limited to, access to 
emergency vehicles, residences, businesses, facilities, paratransit transportation and 
school bus services; and (d) any recommendations to mitigate adverse impact and 
increase access to and within the area.98  
 
When the closure is made by permit, the commissioner must hold “at least one public 
forum, publicized in advance, in any affected community at which the community may 
register its input concerning any potential adverse impacts of the street closure, including but 
not limited to concerns regarding timeliness of emergency vehicle response and traffic 
congestion resulting in a potential increase in noise and any other adverse conditions caused 
by the closure.”99  And when the closure is executed for security reasons, the police 
                                                 
95  § 19-107(ii). 
96  § 19-107(iii). 
97  Id. 
98  Id. 
99  Id. 
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department must hold the public forum.100  Thus, even where closure is temporary, it requires 
the city to remain accountable and keep the public informed.  
These provisions of the N.Y. Code were the guiding authority in Judge Tolub’s 
decision in Wall Street Parking Garage Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.101  On 
March 12, 2004, Judge Walter Tolub held that a private organization could not shut down 
public streets or conduct searches of private persons on those streets without official 
authorization (or perhaps even with such authorization), that under § 5-432 only the city could 
authorize such closures, that the city had not authorized the closure of these streets 
appropriately, and that the operation of these checkpoints by the NYSE security personnel 
was unlawful.102  NYSE was certainly not permitted to control these public spaces without 
some official grant of authority from the NYPD or the city government.  Tolub noted that 
“[t]here is no question that under New York law, the New York City Police Department has 
the authority to temporarily shut down public streets when it deems that there is a necessity 
for their closure, and that those closures may become permanent.  However, this court 
questions whether the NYPD may delegate the maintenance and control of those blockades to 
a private security force without formally delegating some kind of police authority, or even if 
that authority may be delegated at all.” 
And New York City is not alone.  Every state in the Union has a statute or regulation 
pertaining to street closures. 103  Most states have statutes granting city or municipal 
                                                 
100  Id. 
101  3 Misc.3d 1014, 779 N.Y.S.2d 745 (2004). 
102  Id. at 1022-23, 779 N.Y.S.2d at 753.  The injunction against the NYSE was ultimately lifted, though for other 
reasons.  The appellate court found that the plaintiff was unable to show any damage/harm/injuries and reversed 
the order.  But the appeallate court did not disagree with Judge’s Tolub’s holding that NYSE could not shut 
down the streets without some formal grant of authority from the NYPD.  Wall Street Garage Parking Corp. v. 
New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 10 A.D.3d 223, 227, 781 N.Y.S.2d 324, 326 (2004). 
103  See Appendix B (providing a tabular depiction of each of these statutes). 
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governments the power to close streets within their jurisdictions.104  In these states, the cities 
typically forbid private actors from closing streets.  Many of the nation’s twenty largest cities 
has a city law or regulation prohibiting the permanent private obstruction of streets similar to 
§ 5-432 and § 19-107.  In some states, statutes grant general powers to local governments, and 
the courts, interpreting these statutes, have found the closure or vacation of streets to be 
within these grants of powers.105  A handful of states give the power to close streets, whether 
in a county or a city, to the courts or the administrative agencies such as the Departments of 
Highways.106     
                                                 
104  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 23-4-1 (2005);  ALASKA STAT. § 29.40.140 (2005);  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-276 
(2006);  ARK. CODE. ANN. § 14-54-601 (2005);  CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 1920-21 (2006);  COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 31-15-702 (2005);  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-148 (2006);  D.C. CODE § 9-202.04, § 9-203 (2006);  FLA. STAT. § 
336.09 (2005);  GA. CODE ANN. § 36-34-3, § 32-7-2, § 36-30-10 (2005);  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-311 (2005);  
65 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/11-91-1 (2006);  IND. CODE § 36-7-3-12(a)-(e), § 36-9-2-5 (2005);  IOWA CODE § 
354.23, § 364.12 (2005);  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-504, § 12-505 (2004);  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 82.405(1) 
(2005);  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 48:512 (2005);  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30A, § 5118 (2006);  MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 23A, § 2(b)(24) (2006);  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 82, § 21 (2006);  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 67.12, § 102.3 
(2006);  MINN. STAT. § 412.851 (2006);  MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-37-7 (2005);  MO. REV. STAT. § 82.190, § 
88.637, § 88.673 (2005);  MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-14-4114, § 7-3-448 (2005);  NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-115, § 15-
701; § 17-558 (2005);  NEV. REV. STAT. § 278:480 (2006);  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:11 (2005);  N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 40:67-16.9 (2005);  N.M. STAT. § 3-49-1 (2005);  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-299 (2005);  N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 40-05-01(8) (2005);  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 723.05, § 723.04 (2006);  OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, §42-110 
(2005);  OR. REV. STAT. § 271.130; § 271.080 (2003);  53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1672 (2005);  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
45-23.1-2 (2005);  S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 5-27-150 (2005);  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 9-45-1 (2005);  TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 6-2-201(15); § 6-19-101 (2005);  TEX. TRANSP. CODE. ANN. § 311.007; § 311.008 (2005);  UTAH 
CODE ANN. 1953 § 10-8-8 (2005);  VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2 (2005);  WASH. REV. CODE § 35.79.010; § 35.79.030;  
§ 35.22.280 (2006);  W.VA. CODE § 8-12-5 (2006);  WIS. STAT. § 62.22; § 66.1003(2); § 66.1003(4) (2005); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 15-1-103 (2005). 
105  See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-361 (2005); Op.La. Atty.Gen.1946-48, p. 462 (“The governing authority of a 
municipality is authorized to close and vacate a portion of a street where it is no longer needed for public 
purposes.”);  MICH. CONST. art. 7, § 31 (“The legislature shall not vacate or alter any road, street, alley or public 
place under the jurisdiction of any county, township, city or village.”);  Cooper v. City of Detroit (1880) 4 N.W. 
262, 42 Mich. 584 (holding that under art 7, § 31, the rights of the public in city streets may be extinguished by 
legislation in Home Rule Cities). 
106  17 DEL. CODE § 1301 (2006) (“The Superior Court shall have jurisdiction to vacate public roads, bridges and 
all other rights-of-way, including, but not limited to, alleys, pathways, walkways and the like, whether within the 
jurisdiction of the Department, the county in which it is located, municipalities, towns, any governmental 
authority or the general public, including areas not within the jurisdiction of a governmental authority, but for 
which the general public or specific members of the public have acquired an interest.”);  HI. REV. STAT. § 265A-
1 (2004) (“The…councils or…governing bodies of the…political subdivisions of the State shall have the general 
supervision, charge, and control of, and the duty to maintain and repair, all county highways, bikeways, and 
sidewalks and…the councils or other governing bodies may make all regulations needful for the public 
convenience and safety in all cases where permission has been or may be granted to maintain…other structures 
across, under, over, and upon all county highways.  [T]he counties by ordinance may take over, or receive by 
 - 32 -
Where city ordinances explicitly forbid private actors from closing or interfering with 
the operation of public streets, the penal codes generally lay out the penalties to be assessed.  
In New York City, for instance, one who closes or interferes with the operation of a public 
street is guilty of violating N.Y. Penal Law § 240.45.  Where city ordinances merely grant the 
power to close streets to city governments without explicitly forbidding private closure, the 
relevant common law comes into play.  The most notable prohibition of private control over 
public streets is the common law of nuisance.  As the attorneys for the Wall Street Parking 
Garage argued before Judge Tolub, a private corporation appropriating a public street for 
private use constitutes a public nuisance.107  A public nuisance “consists of conduct or 
omissions which offend, interfere with, or cause damage to the public in the exercise of rights 
common to all in a manner such as to offend public morals, interfere with use by the public of 
a public place, or endanger or injure the property, health, safety, or comfort of a considerable 
number of persons.”108  A number of courts have held that blocking or obstructing public 
streets interferes with the public’s right of access and enjoyment and is thus a public 
nuisance.109  At least one court has held that an occupation of a public street that merely 
                                                                                                                                                        
dedication or otherwise, any private street or way or may improve, grade, repair, or do any construction work 
upon private streets, ways, pavement, water lines, street lighting systems, or sewer repairs.”);  VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 19, § 303 (2005) (“Town highways shall be under the general supervision and control of the selectmen of the 
town where the roads are located.”). 
107  Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 13-14, Wall Street Parking Garage Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 
10 A.D.3d 223, 781 N.Y.S.2d 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (No. 103343/04). 
108  Id. (citing 5th Avenue Chocolatiere, Ltd. V. 540 Acquisition Co., L.L.C., 272 A.D.2d  23, 30, 712 N.Y.S.2d 
8, 14 (1st Dep’t 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc., 
96 N.Y.2d 280, 727 N.Y.S.2d 49 (2001).  See also, N.Y. JUR.2D NUISANCES § 5 (defining a public nuisance as 
“conduct or [an] omission which offends, interferes with, or causes damage to the public in the exercise of rights 
common to all, in a manner such as to offend public morals, interfere with use by the public of a public place, or 
endanger or injure the property, health, safety, or comfort of a considerable number of persons.”).  Note that this 
is different from a private nuisance in that a public nuisance causes damage to “the public in the exercise of 
rights common to all.”  See Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 568, 394 N.Y.S.2d 169, 
172, (1977); Preble v. Song Mtn., Inc., 62 Misc. 2d 353, 361, 308 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1010 (Sup. Ct., Cortland Cty 
1970).  
109  See, e.g., Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N.Y. 360, 365 (1887) (noting that “an extensive and continuous use of the 
sidewalk cannot be justified”); Bleichfeld v. Friedenthal, 49 Misc.2d 584, 584, 268 N.Y.S.2d 192, 193 (Sup. Ct. 
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inconveniences the public is a per se public nuisance.110  Furthermore, the fact that the police 
department looks the other way when a private corporation closes a street does not make for 
an express authorization of such a closure; 111 omission is not the same as the affirmative act 
of authorization. 112  And this interpretation of nuisance law is not limited to New York.  
Courts in nearly every state have found private entities that obstruct public streets to be liable 
for creating a public nuisance.113  
i. Applicability of Constitutional Constraints 
In answering the second question, whether the constitutional criminal procedure 
constraints apply where no express authorization or delegation to close streets has been made, 
it would seem logical that they would.  If private security guards conduct illegal searches, the 
fruit of those searches would be inadmissible.114  Unfortunately, logic fails us, and the issue is 
not as clear cut as it would seem.  We begin with the state actor doctrine. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Kings Cty. 1966) (noting that obstruction of a public sidewalk is a public nuisance and enjoining the continued 
maintenance of a fence across a portion of a public sidewalk); Broad Exchange Co. v. Curb Stock & Bond 
Market of New York, Inc., 117 Misc. 82, 87, 191 N.Y.S. 534, 535 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1921) (finding the Curb 
Stock & Bond Market, the predecessor of the American Stock Exchange, guilty of a public nuisance after it 
“began conducting its trades on Broad Street, such that it appropriated half of the vehicular roadway of Broad 
Street for its private use”); Graceland Corp. v. Consol. Laundries Corp., 7 A.D.2d 89, 90, 180 N.Y.S.2d 644, 646 
(1st Dep’t 1958), aff’d 6 N.Y.2d 900, 190 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1959) (holding that a public nuisance existed when a 
laundry parked its trucks on a public sidewalk, restricting access to the plaintiff’s premises). 
110  See Flynn v. Taylor, 127 N.Y. 596, 600-01, 28 N.E. 418, 419 (1891). 
111  See Broad Exchange, 117 Misc. at 90, 191 N.Y.S. at 538-39 (“[A]lthough the exchange’s illegal use of the 
street appeared to be sanctioned by the police department’s inactivity, the police should have performed their 
duty and halted a flagrant public nuisance.”). 
112  Id. 
113  See generally 58 AM. JUR.2D NUISANCES § 34, 38-41 (citing cases from a variety of jurisdictions holding that 
the obstruction of public streets constitutes a public nuisance). 
114  See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that evidence seized in violation of a suspect's 
Fourth Amendment rights, through unreasonable searches and seizures, is inadmissible at the suspect's criminal 
trial); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (holding that evidence obtained as a result of information 
gathered from an improperly obtained confession was inadmissible). 
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The state action doctrine “provides the analytical tools that permit a close review of 
private police action.”115  The Court has identified the following three guiding factors to 
consider in applying the state action doctrine:  
In determining whether a particular action or course of conduct is governmental in 
character, it is relevant to examine the following: [1] the extent to which the actor 
relies on governmental assistance and benefits, [2] whether the actor is performing a 
traditional governmental function, and [3] whether the injury caused is aggravated in a 
unique way by the incidents of governmental authority.116   
 
Several commentators have argued convincingly that courts applying this doctrine 
rigorously would have to conclude that private police action is state action and thus subject at 
the very least to Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment constitutional criminal procedure 
rules.117   
And yet most courts have refused to apply the state action analysis so stringently to 
private police.  Courts have given only “superficial review” to the state action doctrine where 
private policing is concerned.118  Courts focus almost exclusively on whether the state has 
vested private personnel with an official title.’”119  In Burdeau v. McDowell,120 the U.S. 
Supreme Court refused to find a violation of a defendant’s Fourth & Fifth Amendment rights 
where the government obtained incriminating documents the defendant’s employer had 
wrongfully removed from the defendant’s office.121  The Court held with regard to the Fourth 
Amendment that it “gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures…appli[cable 
                                                 
115  Joh, supra note 2, at 94-95. 
116  Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1991). 
117  See Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1250 (“[J]udging the private police by any of these three factors would 
classify them as state actors.... Much…scholarship takes the view that the state action doctrine, if carefully 
applied, would qualify private police as state actors.”). 
118  Joh, supra note 2, at 95. 
119  Joh, supra note 2, at 95 (citing David Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1165, 1250 (1999). 
120  256 U.S. 465 (1921). 
121  Id. at 466. 
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only] to governmental action.”122  The Court held that there could be “no invasion of the 
security afforded by the Fourth Amendment…[because] whatever wrong was done was the 
act of individuals in taking the property of another.”123  It was not the same as the state taking 
the property.  Nor did the Court find a violation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination.  The Court wrote: “We see no reason why the fact that individuals, 
unconnected with the government, may have wrongfully taken [the documents], should 
prevent them from being held for use in prosecuting an offense when the documents are of an 
incriminating character.”124
In Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks125 the Supreme Court laid out a two prong analysis for 
determining what was state action in the context of private actions taken in compliance of 
state law.126  The Court asked whether the private actor was (a) permitted or compelled to 
act,127 and whether (b) the action was an exclusive state function.128  In Flagg, the statute 
permitted, though did not compel, the execution of a lien.  The Court held that the execution 
of that lien was not an exclusive state function.129  Furthermore, the Court in Flagg 
intentionally stopped short of saying whether policing is an exclusive state function.  “We 
express no view as to the extent, if any, to which a city or State might be free to delegate to 
private parties the performance of such functions [as education, fire and police protection, and 
tax collection] and thereby avoid the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment.”130  The Court 
went on to note that “this Court has never considered the private exercise of traditional police 
                                                 
122  Id. at 475. 
123  Id. 
124  Id. at 476. 
125  436 U.S. 149 (1978). 
126  Id. at 166. 
127  Id. at 163 n.11. 
128  Id. at 157-58. 
129  Id. at 162. 
130  Id. at 163–64. 
 - 36 -
functions.  Griffin thus sheds no light on the constitutional status of private police forces, and 
we express no opinion here.”131
The Supreme Court has, on occasion, found private security personnel to be state 
actors, but the facts of these cases were not like the ones in Wall Street Parking Garage.  In 
Williams v. U.S.,132 the Court held that a private investigator was a state actor for the purposes 
of a federal criminal statute imposing fines on public officials for violating another person’s 
constitutional rights.133  The Court found that J.G. Williams violated 18 U.S.C. § 242 when he 
took suspected thieves to a shack on the company’s premises and tortured them with rubber 
hoses, pistols, clubs, etc. until they confessed.134  But the Court held that Williams could be 
prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 242 because he was licensed by the city of Miami, took an oath, 
and was supervised in his interrogation by a city police officer.135  Certainly this is a situation 
far different from an unsupervised NYSE security officer who possesses no such license and 
who took no such oath.  
The Court held likewise in Griffin v. Maryland,136 where it found an amusement park 
security officer to be a state actor for the purposes of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.137  The Court held that because the security guard (a) had been 
deputized by the county sheriff, (b) wore a deputy sheriff’s badge, and (c) identified himself 
as a deputy sheriff, he was a state actor and therefore able to violate the equal protection 
clause by discriminating against African-American patrons of the park.138  “If an individual is 
possessed of state authority and purports to act under that authority, his action is state action.  
                                                 
131  Id. at 164 n.14. 
132  341 U.S. 97 (1951). 
133  Id. at 99-100. 
134  Id. at 98. 
135  Id. at 100. 
136  378 U.S. 130 (1964). 
137  Id. at 135. 
138  Id. 
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It is irrelevant that he might have taken the same action had he acted in a purely private 
capacity or that the particular action that he took was not authorized by state law.” 139  Again, 
because the NYSE officers were not officially deputized, did not wear badges, and did not 
hold themselves out as deputies, courts will be far less likely to find them to be state actors 
under Griffin.    
These NYSE security guards, if not deemed state actors, will be subject only to the 
usual tort remedies of trespass and false imprisonment, the same as if John Q. Citizen had 
conducted the search.  Unless private security guards are deputized or explicitly empowered 
to act as police, the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment criminal procedure protections do 
not apply.  This leads to the absurd conclusion that while private policing or closure of public 
streets is impermissible and such officials may be enjoined from conducting any future 
searches, anything seized by these private security officials in prior searches is freely 
admissible in a court of law. 
There is an argument to be made, of course, that courts are likely to distinguish the 
private police officers in Williams and Griffin from those private security guards not expressly 
deputized or empowered by the city but whose actions take place on publicly-owned land 
based on that last crucial element: action on public land.  When the policing takes place on 
public land, that extra element changes the analysis and leads to the likely conclusion that 
courts will apply the state actor doctrine by implication for Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendment purposes.  Furthermore, the fact that the NYPD worked alongside the NYSE 
officials, even if only for a short time, may lead courts to view this case as one of “joint 
action.”  As Elizabeth Joh explains:  
                                                 
139  Id. 
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When public police openly and directly control what private police do, courts have 
found little trouble finding state action, and therefore the applicability of constitutional 
criminal procedure law.  The same is true when courts determine that there has been a 
‘joint endeavor’ between public and private, as when a private investigator working 
for an insurance company searches a burned home with the local public police, or 
when private credit card fraud investigators work together with public police 
officers.”140   
 
In the case of the NYSE security checkpoints, based on the fact that the NYPD and 
NYSE officials worked side by side for a period of time before the NYPD relinquished total 
control to NYSE, the fact that NYPD implicitly authorized NYSE officials to continue to 
maintain the secure zone themselves, and the fact that the action took place on public land, 
courts might find such action to constitute state action.  Courts would then be expected to 
apply the federal rules of constitutional criminal procedure.  Still, since none of the courts 
discussed above have dealt with private actors on publicly-owned streets or land, and since 
the NYSE officials were not explicitly authorized to act, we cannot predict with any degree of 
certainty that courts will make this leap.  It is instead more likely that they will view non-
deputized NYSE officials operating without formal authorization as private actors subject 
only to common law tort remedies.  Evidence obtained by these NYSE officials would be 
admissible in court.  
 
B. Where Express Delegation Has Been Made 
 
Where public officials or police have expressly delegated the power to control and 
police public space to private security guards, courts are likely to find this delegation and 
subsequent actions by private security on public land permissible.  The reasoning is 
straightforward.  As discussed in Part IV.A of this Paper, express delegation is necessary to 
make the actual policing legal.  Judge Tolub held that private security officials have no power 
                                                 
140  Joh, supra note 2, at 116 (citations omitted). 
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to police public streets.141  Only through a public grant of power can private police act legally 
on public land.  And express authorization removes concerns usually present with private 
policing by making private security forces, like the NYSE officials, state actors and thus 
bound by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth amendments’ strictures of criminal procedure. 
Of course, not all courts will allow even the express delegation of public police 
powers on public land.  Judge Tolub, for example, expressed doubt about whether such 
private policing of public land would be permissible even with express delegation from the 
city.142  “[T]his court questions whether the NYPD may delegate the maintenance and control 
of those blockades to a private security force without formally delegating some kind of police 
authority, or even if that authority may be delegated at all.”143  It is therefore important to 
recognize that even with such a grant of authority, the legality of private control of public 
spaces by private actors is uncertain. 
ii. Applicability of Constitutional Constraints 
As for the second question, whether constitutional criminal procedure constraints 
apply, the answer should be yes.  If private security is expressly authorized to police publicly-
owned land, courts should have no difficulty finding these private security officers to be state 
actors for the purpose of applying constitutional criminal procedure protection.  As discussed 
supra, the state action doctrine contains three guiding factors.144  To determine whether a 
particular action or course of conduct is governmental in character, the actor must “rel[y] on 
governmental assistance and benefits, … perform[] a traditional governmental function, 
and…the injury caused [must be] aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of 
                                                 
141  Wall Street Parking Garage Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 3 Misc.3d 1014, 1022-23, 779 
N.Y.S.2d 745, 753 (2004). 
142  Id. 
143  Id. 
144  See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. 
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governmental authority.”145  Each of these elements is satisfied when private police control 
public space with the express authorization of the city government.  There is little doubt that 
the expressly authorized policing of city streets is a traditional public function.  
But even here, what seems like a logical outcome is not unassailable.  There is some 
indication that constitutional criminal procedure rules may not apply even with express 
delegation.  In Flagg Bros. v. Brooks,146 even state delegation of power to private entities did 
not make those private entities state actors.147  The court discussed the difference between a 
statute that permits a private actor to act and one that compels that actor to act.  In the latter, 
the court is likely to find the actor to be a state actor and thus able to violate constitutional 
rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth amendments.148  But in the former, the 
fact that a statute merely permits a person to act to curtail another’s liberties does not make 
that actor a state actor.149  If a delegation of authority from the NYPD to the NYSE only 
permitted the NYSE officers to police the area, but did not compel it, it is conceivable that a 
court might not find the NYSE officials’ actions to constitute state action under Flagg.     
The court in Flagg Bros. also held that in order for a private entity to be considered a 
state actor, they had to be doing an exclusive state function.  The Court in Flagg Bros. refused 
to define the universe of exclusive state functions, and interestingly for us, refused to say if 
policing was exclusive state function.150  “We express no view as to the extent, if any, to 
which a city of State might be free to delegate to private parties the performance of such 
functions [as education, fire and police protection, and tax collection] and thereby avoid the 
                                                 
145  Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1991). 
146  436 U.S. 149 (1978). 
147  Id. at 164-66. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. at 163-64. 
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strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment.”151  The Court went on to note that “this Court has 
never considered the private exercise of traditional police functions.  Griffin thus sheds no 
light on the constitutional status of private police forces, and we express no opinion here.”152
Once again, the element of public land may serve to distinguish Flagg from the NYSE 
case; the fact that the alleged violation of rights occurred on public land in Wall Street 
Parking Garage serves to distinguish the case from the facts in Flagg.  And in a case where 
the delegation of authority is clear and express, the facts weigh even heavier on the side of an 
affirmative finding of state action.  Therefore, based on the express nature of the delegation 
and where the action took place, we can say with relative certainty that when police power is 
officially delegated to private actors, constitutional criminal procedural constraints will apply.  
Evidence seized will not be admissible in court.        
 
PART V: PROPOSALS 
 
As discussed in Section III, there are political, economic, and social reasons why the 
private control of public space such as streets and sidewalks is both necessary and desirable.  
To obtain these benefits, however, this private action must be legally permissible and must 
respect the legal rights of a city’s citizens.  The following proposals attempt to provide a 
comprehensive solution. 
First, if, as is the case in most states,153 state law grants cities the power to close 
streets, those cities should allow public streets to be closed, vacated, or abandoned only 
through enactment of a city ordinance.  The impact on public life that results from the closure 
                                                 
151  Id. 
152  Id. at 164 n.14.  But see id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“For instance, it is clear that the maintenance of a police 
force is a unique sovereign function, and the delegation of police power to a private party will entail state 
action.”) (citations omitted);  Sklansky, supra note 5, at 1189 (noting that the very first police in the United 
States were private constables and that a tradition of public policing, as we know it today did not become the 
norm until late in the Nineteenth Century). 
153  See supra notes 103-06. 
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of a city street is significant enough to require the highest level of urban political scrutiny.  A 
bill passed by the city council should be required.  If, due to the volume of business coming 
before the city council, the council is unable to afford attention to every proposal for street 
closure, the council can certainly delegate the review of street closure proposals to a city 
agency such as the Department of City Planning or the Department of Transportation.  
Review at this level of government still assures a meaningful degree of public input.  After 
receiving a recommendation from the reviewing agency, the city council can simply vote in 
favor of or against the recommendation.  This saves the council time while avoiding the type 
of illegal street closure that occurred around Wall Street in 2001.   
Second, cities should also enact ordinances that grant their police departments the 
power to deputize private property owners for the express purpose of policing closed or 
cordoned city streets.  Once the city council has passed an ordinance closing a particular street 
or group of streets, the police department can either police that area itself or delegate its 
power to do so by deputizing private property owners.  Such an ordinance would require the 
police department to complete an order of deputization in order to delegate its police power to 
a private organizations or citizens.  Such an order would explicitly list the names of 
individuals empowered to act on the police department’s behalf and would list the specific 
powers of such deputies, thereby assuring some greater degree of accountability.  Such an 
ordinance might even streamline the process by which private individuals are deputized if 
those individuals are licensed security personnel, as were the NYSE security personnel.  A 
proposed ordinance might allow private security personnel to (a) deny access to public space, 
(b) erect safety mechanisms such as bollards, cameras, and temporary jersey barriers, (c) eject 
visitors, and (d) search these individuals.  With respect to the power to search individuals on 
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or wishing to enter public space, the delegation ordinance would permit private security 
personnel to conduct minimal searches.  These searches would be similar to Terry stop 
searches.154  They would be non-invasive, consisting of the search of packages, bags, bulky 
clothing, and vehicles only.  The searches would last only so long as needed to ensure that the 
individual does not have a dangerous weapon.   
Some state’s statutory schemes already allow similar set-ups.  For example, in 
Nebraska, city councils can lease their public streets to private businesses, and these 
businesses can then close the streets and sidewalks for the sale of services or goods or “for the 
placement of nonpermanent sidewalk cafes, tables, chairs, benches….”.155  The enactment of 
a delegation ordinance would allow those leasing the public space to police the area but 
within defined parameters of acceptable behavior. 
Third, the express delegation ordinance must explicitly state that deputized security 
personnel are state actors and subject to the full spectrum of constitutional criminal procedure 
constraints.  Therefore, the fruits of searches that would violate the Fourth Amendment 
prohibitions of unreasonable search and seizure if conducted by public police would be 
equally inadmissible in courts of law as evidence against the individual searched.  
Incriminating statements made to these private police officials would be inadmissible under 
the Fifth Amendment.      
                                                 
154  A Terry stop consists of a brief "stop and frisk" of a person by a law enforcement officer based on that 
officer’s reasonable suspicion.  It derives its name from Terry v. Ohio, in which the Court held that “where a 
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that 
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently 
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes 
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear 
for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a 
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be 
used to assault him.”  392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).  
155  NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-4301(1).  See also ALASKA STAT. § 29.35.060 (allowing the city council to “grant 
franchises, including exclusive franchise privileges, to a person, corporation, organization, or utility…and may 
permit the use of streets and other public places by the franchise holder under regulations prescribed by 
ordinance.”).
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Some law enforcement officials will balk at this second proposal, the applicability of 
constitutional criminal procedural strictures.  They will chafe at the way this hampers the 
prosecution of would-be terrorists caught in the act.  But such a compromise is a necessary 
concession to make if the overarching goal of this power is to have effect: the prevention of 
property destruction and loss of life.  The primary goal of allowing private security officials to 
control public space is to prevent terrorism and other attacks on the public from occurring in 
U.S. cities.  Being able to prosecute those who attempt to commit these acts, though 
important, is a secondary goal.  Both these goals are evaluated with an eye towards the need 
to respect the constitutional rights of the public we are trying to protect.  The proper  balance 
to be struck then, at least according to this author, is to allow such delegation of search and 
seizure powers, because the protection of life is tantamount to all else, but to rule evidence 
improperly obtained in such searches inadmissible in courts of law.  The ability to stop a 
would-be terrorist at a checkpoint, search her vehicle, and deny her access to her target will 
trump nearly all else, but the protection of constitutional rights against improper search and 
seizure and compelled self-incrimination will trump the ability to admit evidence that may be 
necessary to prosecute that would-be terrorist. 
Finally, even when the power to control access to and conduct searches on publicly-
owned land is not expressly delegated by police departments or a city, as was the case in Wall 
Street Parking Garage, courts must find private police controlling access to and conducting 
searches on that land to be subject to constitutional criminal procedure.  Courts should apply 
the Flagg test, but find specifically that the private policing of publicly-owned land is state 
action.  Though the Flagg court did not consider whether policing was an exclusive state 
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function, any policing on publicly-owned land should be deemed an exclusively public 
function and held to the highest level of scrutiny. 
For those whose concerns are not alleviated by the applicability of the Fourth, Fifth, 
and Sixth Amendments, for those who will no doubt rail at the ability of private security to 
abuse their powers by removing individuals who they merely “don’t like,” there is comfort.  It 
is unlikely that private security personnel will use their powers to harass or commit arbitrary 
discrimination on a large scale.  Practical application, the demands of time and resources, will 
prevent the average user from being thrown out of the square for arbitrary reasons.  Arbitrary 
discrimination is certainly possible, but the cost of security and the propensity for these 
individuals towards apathy speaks against abuse.   
The desirability of these proposals can be best understood if applied in hindsight to the 
facts of Wall Street Parking Garage.  Had these proposals been law in New York State and 
City before 2001, the NYPD would not have been able to close the streets surrounding the 
stock exchange on its own.  It would have had to ask the New York City Council to enact an 
ordinance closing the streets to thru traffic.  There is no reason to think the City Council 
would not have done so with all due haste in the wake of the September 11th attacks.  It would 
have been a formality, but an important one in terms of public accountability.   
Had these proposals been law in New York before 2001, the NYPD would not have 
been able to simply hand over the operation of the barricades to NYSE security officials.  The 
NYPD would have had to obtain lists of NYSE security officials, conduct some meaningful 
background checks on those individuals, and provide those individuals with some information 
regarding the scope of their powers as deputies.  Then the NYPD would have had to complete 
the paperwork to make the deputization official.  Criticism that such a hurdle is meaningless 
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is misplaced.  Even the simple requirement that the NYPD fill out paperwork to make legal 
what they did de facto serves to remind those members of the NYPD responsible and the 
deputized security personnel that they are serving the public and entrusted with the public’s 
confidence and well being.  This simple reminder might be enough to shape the actions of the 
private actors at least.  If nothing else, the formality, the official nature of the act might give 
the private security officials pause to consider the legal ramifications of their actions, e.g. can 
I be sued if I trample on someone’s constitutional rights? 
Furthermore, had these proposals been law in New York before 2001, there would 
have been no doubt about the NYPD’s power to delegate such police power at all.  The 
ordinance allowing for such delegation would have removed all doubt in Judge Tolub’s mind 
as to whether the city could delegate its police power over streets and replaced such doubt 
with assurances that the power was limited and delineated explicitly. 
Lastly, had these proposals been law in New York before 2001, there would be far less 
doubt over the status of the deputized security personnel as state actors.  Any evidence seized 
by these individuals or any statements and admissions made during these searches would be 
admissible in courts of law as required by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.  If the 
deputies acted in bad faith or without the necessary degree of suspicion or cause, the evidence 





Five years after the attacks of September 11th, we are in a far better position to assess 
our immediate reactions to that days’ events.  In part, September 11th made us more aware of 
the need to secure our nations’ landmarks.  A history of good fortune and a lack of 
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imagination on our part created a false sense of security.  September 11th made us realize how 
important securing our nation’s great cities is to our national security and how important the 
closure of public streets can be to achieving this urban security.  We had always known that 
closing streets around our great public gathering spots offered some social and economic 
benefits.  The creation of public gathering spots allowed the public to intermingle, to eat, 
drink, and socialize, in an outdoor setting in dense urban centers.  Until September 11th, 2001, 
however, these interests were outweighed by the interests in maintaining the flow of traffic 
and keeping public expenditures low.  Only when the added issue of security was added to the 
mix did the closure of city streets become feasible.  In the end, it took a calamity the size of 
9/11 to move us ahead in achieving the political, economic, and social benefits that come 
when we close public spaces off to motor vehicles and allow them to be privately controlled.  
But that calamity moved us so quickly and blindly towards these benefits that we failed to 
take the time to do it right.  We began to ride roughshod over important societal values and 
procedures integral to our national character.  What’s more, achieving these political, 
economic, and social benefits of private control of public spaces was not incompatible with 
these other societal values espoused in our constitutional principles and procedures.  We 
simply did not pause to consider how we might obtain the benefits while respecting the law.  
This Paper has offered a multi-part proposal in an attempt to achieve the goals of national 
security, great “place making,” and economy yet in a way that respects the political and 
constitutional rights and duties that exist in tandem.  If followed, our cities can be full of 
public spaces, closed to motor vehicles and secured from terrorist threats, maintained by 
private individuals working for the public and private benefit, and yet respectful of the 
constitutional rights of the citizens of those great cities.   
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In the 1990s, despite decades of assertions to the contrary, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani 
proved that the nation’s largest city was not in fact ungovernable.  Neither is that city, or any 
other city, unsecurable or unlivable.  It simply takes patience, ambition, and creativity to 
secure these cities and make them livable, but it may require the involvement of the private 
sector to do this effectively.     
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APPENDIX A:  Map of Lower Manhattan’s Financial District 
 
 
APPENDIX B:  Table of State Statutes 
 
 State Code Section Textual Provisions 
1 Alabama Ala. Code § 23-4-1 “Streets, alleys and other highways, or portions thereof, may be closed and 
vacated upon the application of the municipality in which they are situated and, 
where not situated in a municipality, upon the application of the county in which 
they are situated in the manner provided for in this article.” 
2 Alaska AK Stat. § 29.40.140 “The platting authority shall consider the alteration or replat petition at a hearing 
and make its decision on the merits of the proposal.  Vacation of a city street may 
not be made without the consent of the [city] council.” 
3 Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-276 “[C]ities and their governing bodies may… regulate the use, …vacate, alter,…or 
otherwise improve streets, alleys, avenues, sidewalks, parks, public grounds and 
off-street parking sites.” 
4 Arkansas Ark. Code. Ann. § 14-54-601 “Municipal corporations shall have power to…[with] regard to streets, alleys, 
public grounds…and marketplaces, lay off, open, widen, straighten, and establish 
them, straighten, and establish them.” 
5 California Cal. Str. & H. Code § 1920-21 “When the governing body of a city by resolution or ordinance removes a street 
from public use, or closes it to vehicular or pedestrian traffic, such resolution or 
ordinance may set forth such minimum maintenance requirements.” 
6 Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-15-
702 
“The governing body of each municipality has the power…[t]o lay out, establish, 
open, alter, widen, extend, grade, pave, or otherwise improve streets, parks, and 
public grounds and vacate the same.” 
7 Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-148 ([A] municipality may, by ordinance, “alter…streets, alleys, 
boulevards,…sidewalks,…public walks” and may “[grant to abutting property 
owners a limited property or leasehold interest in abutting streets and sidewalks 
for the purpose of encouraging and supporting private commercial 
development.”) 
8 D.C. D.C. Code § 9-203 “Mayor may close all or part of any street or alley which is determined by the 
Council to be unnecessary for street or alley purposes, upon approval of a 
proposed resolution submitted by the mayor to the council for its review.” 
  § 9-202.04 Public hearing required. 
9 Delaware 17 Del. Code § 1301 (“The Superior Court shall have jurisdiction to vacate public roads, bridges and 
all other rights-of-way, including, but not limited to, alleys, pathways, walkways 
and the like, whether within the jurisdiction of the Department, the county in 
which it is located, municipalities, towns, any governmental authority or the 
general public, including areas not within the jurisdiction of a governmental 
authority, but for which the general public or specific members of the public have 
acquired an interest.” 
10 Florida Fla. Stat. Ann. § 336.09 “City commissioners may, upon request of state agency or federal government or 
petition of any person, close any existing public street.” 
11 Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 36-34-3, § 32-
7-2 
“In addition to the other powers it may have, any municipal corporation shall 
have the power, in the interest of the health and general welfare, to…close, or 
extend public streets, alleys, sidewalks, parks….” 
  § 36-30-10 “Without express legislative authority, a municipal corporation may not grant to 
any person the right to erect or maintain a structure or obstruction in a public 
street.” 
12 Hawaii Hi. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 265A-1. (“The…councils or…governing bodies of the…political subdivisions of the State 
shall have the general supervision, charge, and control of, and the duty to 
maintain and repair, all county highways, bikeways, and sidewalks and…the 
councils or other governing bodies may make all regulations needful for the 
public convenience and safety in all cases where permission has been or may be 
granted to maintain…other structures across, under, over, and upon all county 
highways.  [T]he counties by ordinance may take over, or receive by dedication 
or otherwise, any private street or way or may improve, grade, repair, or do any 
construction work upon private streets, ways, pavement, water lines, street 
lighting systems, or sewer repairs.” 
13 Idaho Idaho Code § 50-311 “Cities are empowered to: create, open, widen or extend any street, avenue, alley 
or lane, annul, vacate or discontinue the same whenever deemed expedient for the 
public good.” 
14 Illinois 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/11-
91-1 
“Whenever the corporate authorities of any municipality, whether incorporated by 
special act or under any general law, determine that the public interest will be 
subserved by vacating any street or alley, or part thereof, within their jurisdiction 
in any incorporated area, they may vacate that street or alley, or part thereof, by 
an ordinance.” 
15 Indiana In. Code § 36-7-3-12(a)-(e) 
 
“Persons who…own or are interested in any lots or parts of lots; and…want to 
vacate all or part of a public way or public place in or contiguous to those lots or 










parts of lots…may file a petition for vacation with the legislative body of…a 
municipality, if all or any part of the public way or public place to be vacated is 
located within the corporate boundaries of that municipality; or…the county, if all 
or the only part of the public way or public place to be vacated is located outside 
the corporate boundaries of a municipality.  After the hearing on the petition, the 
legislative body may, by ordinance, vacate the public way or public place.” 
 
 
  § 36-9-2-5 “A unit [of city or town government] may establish, vacate, maintain, and operate 
public ways.” 
16 Iowa Iowa Code Ann. § 354.23 “A city or a county may vacate part of an official plat that had been conveyed to 
the city or county or dedicated to the public which is deemed by the governing 
body to be of no benefit to the public.” 
  Iowa Code Ann. § 364.12 “A city shall keep all public grounds, streets, sidewalks,…alleys,…public ways, 
[and] squares, open…and free from nuisance, with the following exceptions: 
[p]ublic ways and grounds may be temporarily closed by resolution.  Following 
notice…public ways and grounds may be vacated by ordinance.” 
17 Kansas Kansas Stat. Ann. § 12-504 “Whenever the governing body of the city in which any of the following are 
located or…the owner or owners of the lands adjoining on both sides of any 
street…desires to have the same vacated…the governing body of such city or the 
city planning commission shall give public notice of the same….” 
  § 12-505 “[I]f the governing body…determines…that due and legal notice has been given 
…and that no private rights will be injured or endangered by such vacation or 
exclusion, and that the public will suffer no loss or inconvenience thereby…the 
governing body shall order that such vacation or exclusion, or both, be made.”
18 Kentucky Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 82.405(1) “If a legislative body of a city determines that a public way located within the city 
should be closed in whole or in part…the legislative body may proceed to close 
the public way or portion thereof….” 
19 Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 48:512 “No person shall close, obstruct, or change any legal road, public road, or 
street…and being a parish or municipal road, except upon order of the governing 
authority of the parish for a parish road…or upon order of the governing authority 
of the municipality for a municipal road….” 
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  La. Rev. Stat. Ann § 33-361 “A municipality is…authorized to exercise any power and perform any function 
necessary, requisite, or proper for the management of its affairs not denied by 
law.” 
  Op.La. Atty.Gen.1946-48, p. 
462 
“The governing authority of a municipality is authorized to close and vacate a 
portion of a street where it is no longer needed for public purposes.” 
20 Maine 30A Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
5118 
“For the purpose of aiding and cooperating in…an urban renewal project, the 
municipality…may…close, vacate…streets, roads, sidewalks, ways or other 
places….” 
21 Massachusetts Mass.  Gen. Laws Ann.  82, § 21 “[A] town or city council of a city may lay out, relocate or alter town ways, for the 
use of the town or city…or they…may discontinue a town way or a private way.” 
22 Maryland Md. Code, art. 23A, § 2(b)(24) “The legislative body of every incorporated municipality…shall have the 
following express ordinance-making powers…to sell…and to convey …any real 
or leasehold property belonging to the municipality when such legislative body 
determines that the same is no longer needed for any public use.” 
23 Michigan Mich. Const. art. 7, § 29 “Except as otherwise provided in this constitution the right of all counties, 
townships, cities and villages to the reasonable control of their highways, streets, 
alleys and public places is hereby reserved to such local units of government..” 
  Mich. Const. art. 7, § 31 “The legislature shall not vacate or alter any road, street, alley or public place 
under the jurisdiction of any county, township, city or village.” 
  Cooper v. City of Detroit (1880) 
4 N.W. 262, 42 Mich. 584 
Holding that under art 7, § 31, the rights of the public in city streets may be 
extinguished by legislation in Home Rule Cities. 
  Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. §67.12 With respect to villages, “[t]he council may…alter, close, vacate, or abolish a 
highway, street, lane, alley, sidewalk…if the council considers it to be a public 
improvement, or necessary for the public convenience.” 
  Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §102.3 With respect to Fourth Class Cities, “when the council shall deem it advisable 
tovacate, discontinue or abolish any street, alley or public ground, or any part 
thereof, they shall by resolution so declare….” 
24 Minnesota Minn. Stat. Ann. § 412.851 “The [city] council may by resolution vacate any street, alley, public grounds, 
public way, or any part thereof, on its own motion or on petition of a majority of 
the owners of land abutting on the street, alley, public grounds, public way, or 
part thereof to be vacated.  No vacation shall be made unless it appears in the 
interest of the public to do so after a hearing preceded by two weeks' published 
and posted notice.” 
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25 Mississippi Ms. Code Ann. § 21-37-7 “The governing authorities of municipalities shall have the power to close and 
vacate any street or alley, or any portion thereof.” 
26 Missouri Mo. Stat. Ann. § 82.190 “A constitutional charter] city shall have exclusive control over its public 
highways, streets, avenues, alleys and public places, and shall have exclusive 
power, by ordinance, to vacate or abandon any public highway, street, avenue, 
alley or public place, or part thereof, any law of this state to the contrary 
notwithstanding.” 
  § 88.637 Granting power to close streets to Third Class Cities. 
  § 88.673 Granting to close streets to Fourth Class Cities. 
27 Montana Montana Stat. Ann. § 7-14-4114 “The [city] council may discontinue a street or alley or any part of a street or alley 
in a city or town, if it can be done without detriment to the public interest, 
upon…a petition in writing of all owners of lots on the street or alley; 
or…approval by a majority vote of the council.” 
  § 7-3-448 Granting same powers in cities with commission-city manager forms of 
government. 
28 Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. § 14-115 “[T]he city council [of a metropolitan class city] may, by concurrent resolution, 
declare [an] existing plat and the streets and alleys therein vacated.” 
  § 15-701 “The city council [of a primary class city] shall have power by ordinance to 
create, open, widen or otherwise improve, vacate, control, name, and rename any 
street, alley, or public way or ways, including the sidewalk space within the limits 
of the city.” 
  § 17-558 “Cities of the second class and villages shall have power to open, widen, or 
otherwise improve or vacate any street, avenue, alley, or lane within the limits of 
the city or village and also to create, open, and improve any new street, avenue, 
alley, or lane.” 
29 Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. § 278:480 “[A]ny abutting owner or local government desiring the vacation or abandonment 
of any street or easement owned by a city or a county…shall file a petition in 
writing with the planning commission or the governing body having jurisdiction.  
The governing body may establish by ordinance a procedure by which…a 
vacation or abandonment of a street or an easement may be approved.  [I]f, upon 
public hearing, the governing body…is satisfied that the public will not be 
materially injured by the proposed vacation, it shall order the street or easement 
vacated.” 
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30 New 
Hampshire 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 674:11 “The local legislative body is authorized and empowered, whenever and as often 
as it may deem it advisable or necessary for the public interest…to widen, extend, 
relocate, narrow, vacate, abandon, or close existing streets or parks, and to 
indicate the acceptance of, change of use, acquisition of land for, or sale or lease 
of any street or other public way, ground, place, property, or structure.” 
31 New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:67-16.9 Governing body of municipality may, by ordinance, authorize mayor to provide 
by regulation for the closing of a street. 
32 New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. 1978, § 3-49-1 “A municipality may lay out, establish, open, vacate, alter, repair, widen, extend, 
grade, pave or otherwise improve streets, including, but not necessarily limited to 
median and divider strips, parkways and boulevards; alleys, avenues, sidewalks, 
curbs, gutters and public grounds….” 
33 North 
Carolina 
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 160A-
299 
 “When a city proposes to permanently close any street or public alley, the 
council shall first adopt a resolution declaring its intent to close the street or alley 
and calling a public hearing on the question.  If it appears to the satisfaction of the 
council after the hearing that closing the street or alley is not contrary to the 
public interest, and that no individual owning property in the vicinity of the street 
or alley or in the subdivision in which it is located would thereby be deprived of 
reasonable means of ingress and egress to his property, the council may adopt an 
order closing the street or alley.” 
34 North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code § 40-05-01(8) “The governing body of a municipality shall have the power…[t]o…alter, 
vacate,…or otherwise improve and regulate the use of streets, alleys, avenues, 
sidewalks, crossings, and public grounds…to regulate or prevent any practice 
having a tendency to annoy persons frequenting the same; and to prevent and 
regulate obstructions and encroachments upon the same.” 
35 Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 723.05 “The legislative authority of a municipal corporation may… by ordinance and 
without petition therefor, vacate or narrow such street or alley or any part 
thereof…[w]hen, in the opinion of the legislative authority, there is good cause 
for vacating or narrowing a street or alley, or any part thereof, and that such 
vacation or narrowing will not be detrimental to the general interest….”  
  § 723.04 Granting city governments same power to vacate on petition of interested 
members of the public. 
36 Oklahoma 11 Okla. Stat. Ann. §42-110 “The municipal governing body by ordinance may close to the public use any 
public way or easement within the municipality whenever deemed necessary or 
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expedient. The procedure for closing a public way or easement shall be 
established by ordinance or resolution adopted by the municipality.” 
37 Oregon Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271.130 “The city governing body may initiate vacation proceedings and make such 
vacation without a petition or consent of property owners.” 
  § 271.080 Granting city governing body power to vacate streets on petition of interested 
members of the public. 
38 Pennsylvania 53 Penn. Stat. § 1672 “Every municipal corporation shall have power…to vacate streets or alleys, or 
parts thereof, upon the petition of a majority in number and interest of owners of 
property abutting on the line of the proposed improvements….  Every municipal 
corporation shall have power, whenever the councils or authorities thereof shall 
deem it necessary…to vacate streets or alleys, or parts thereof, without any 
petition of property owners.” 
39 Rhode Island R.I. Stat. Ann. § 45-23.1-2 “A city or town council is authorized and empowered to make, from time to time, 
additions to or modifications of the official map by placing on it the exterior lines 
of planned new streets or street extensions, widenings, narrowings, or vacations.” 
40 South 
Carolina 
S.C. Code 1976 § 5-27-150 “The city council of any city containing more than five thousand inhabitants may 
open new streets, close, widen, or alter streets in the city when, in its judgment, it 
may be necessary for the improvement of the city.” 
41 South Dakota S.D. Cod. Laws § 9-45-1 “Every municipality shall have power to…vacate [or] alter…roads, streets, alleys, 
sidewalks, and public grounds.” 
42 Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-2-201(15) “Every municipality incorporated under this charter may...vacate [or] 
alter…public highways, streets, boulevards, parkways, sidewalks, alleys, parks, 
public grounds…and squares, regulate their use within the corporate limits, assess 
fees for the use of or impact upon such property and facilities, and take and 
appropriate property….” 
  § 6-19-101 “Every city incorporated under chapters 18-22 of this title may… vacate [or] 
alter…public highways, streets, boulevards, parkways, sidewalks, alleys, parks, 
public grounds, and squares…and regulate the use thereof within the corporate 
limits….” 
43 Texas Tex. Code. Ann., Transportation 
Code § 311.007 
“A home-rule municipality may vacate, abandon, or close a street or alley.”  
  § 311.008 “The governing body of a general-law municipality by ordinance may vacate, 
abandon, or close a street or alley of the municipality if a petition signed by all 
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the owners of real property abutting the street or alley is submitted to the 
governing body.” 
44 Utah Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 10-8-8 “A municipal legislative body may alter,…narrow,…or otherwise improve 
streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks, parks,…for the parking of vehicles 
off streets, public grounds, and pedestrian malls and may vacate the same or parts 
thereof, as provided in this title.” 
45 Virginia Va. Code § 15.2-2006 “Public rights-of-way in localities may be altered or vacated on motion of such 
governing bodies or on application of any person after notice of intention to do so 
has been published.” 
46 Vermont 19 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 301 “Town highways shall be under the general supervision and control of the 
selectmen of the town where the roads are located.” 
47 Washington Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 
35.79.010 
“The owners of an interest in any real estate abutting upon any street or alley who 
may desire to vacate the street or alley, or any part thereof, may petition the 
legislative authority to make vacation…or the legislative authority may itself 
initiate by resolution such vacation procedure.” 
  § 35.79.030 “If the legislative authority determines to grant said petition or any part thereof, 
such city or town shall be authorized and have authority by ordinance to vacate 
such street, or alley, or any part thereof….”   
  § 35.22.280 “Any city of the first class shall have power…[t]o lay out, establish, open, alter, 
widen, extend, grade, pave, plank, establish grades, or otherwise improve streets, 
alleys, avenues, sidewalks, wharves, parks, and other public grounds, and to 
regulate and control the use thereof, and to vacate the same.” 
48 West Virginia W.Va. Code § 8-12-5 “[E]very municipality and the governing body thereof shall have plenary power 
and authority therein by ordinance or resolution, as the case may require, and by 
appropriate action based thereon…[t]o lay off, establish, construct, open, 
alter,…vacate, discontinue and close, streets, avenues, roads, alleys, ways, 
sidewalks, drains and gutters, for the use of the public….” 
49 Wisconsin Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 62.22 “The governing body of any city…may sell and convey property…real or 
personal, within or outside the city, for parks, recreation, water systems, sewage 
or waste disposal, airports or approaches thereto, cemeteries, vehicle parking 
areas, and for any other public purpose.” 
  § 66.1003(2) “The common council of any city,…village or town…may discontinue all or part 
of a public way upon the written petition of the owners of all the frontage of the 
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lots and lands abutting upon the public way sought to be discontinued, and of the 
owners of more than one-third of the frontage of the lots and lands abutting on 
that portion of the remainder of the public way which lies within 2,650 feet of the 
ends of the portion to be discontinued, or lies within so much of that 2,650 feet as 
is within the corporate limits of the city, village or town.”   
  § 66.1003(4) “[P]roceedings covered by this section may be initiated by the common council or 
village or town board by the introduction of a resolution declaring that since the 
public interest requires it, a public way or an unpaved alley is vacated and 
discontinued.” 
50 Wyoming Wy Stat. § 15-1-103 “The governing bodies of all cities and towns may… [t]ake all necessary action to 
plan, construct or otherwise improve, modify, repair, maintain and regulate the 
use of streets, including the regulation of any structures thereunder, alleys, any 
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